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WEIGHT VERSUS SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE:
TIBBS v. FLORIDA
INTRODUCTION
The double jeopardy clause provides that no person shall be
twice brought into danger of prosecution for one and the same of-
fense.1 This constitutional provision protects an accused from be-
ing subjected to a second punishment2 as well as from being tried
again for the same crime.3
The protection against retrial for the same offense is not ap-
plicable, however, when an appellate court reverses a defendant's
conviction because of an error in the trial proceedings.4 Retrial is
allowed in this case on the rationale that the reversal of the convic-
tion implies neither the accused's guilt or innocence, nor the gov-
ernment's failure to prove its case.5
On the other hand, the double jeopardy protection against re-
trial for the same offense will apply when an appellate court
reverses the defendant's conviction based on insufficiency of the
evidence.' In this case, unlike that of trial error, reversal means
that the government's case was so lacking that it never should have
been brought before a jury. Since the defendant should have been
1. "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause was made applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
2. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873); United States v.
Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931).
3. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651, 660-61 (1977); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1975); United States v.
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 124 (1966); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1896); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). For the scope of the constitutional protections af-
forded by the double jeopardy clause see generally, 3 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§
655-661 (C. Tortia 13th ed. 1972); Meyers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari New Trials and Suc-
cessive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1960); Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeop-
ardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001
(1980); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
4. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
14-16 (1978).
5. Burks, 437 U.S. at 15.
6. Id. at 15-17.
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acquitted at the trial level, retrial would give the government an
unwarranted second opportunity to prove its case.7
In Tibbs v. Florida,8 however, the Supreme Court considered
the double jeopardy issue as it arose when an appellate court re-
versed a conviction, not on the ground of trial error or insufficient
evidence, but because the record showed a lack of evidentiary
weight. The Court ruled that when an appellate court reverses a
conviction on this basis the double jeopardy clause will not protect
the defendant against retrial.' The Court held that, in contrast to a
conviction reversed because of insufficiency of evidence, a reversal
based on lack of evidentiary weight does not imply that acquittal
was the only proper verdict, or that the government failed to prove
its case. Rather, a reversal based on the weight of the evidence
means only that the appellate court, sitting as a "thirteenth juror,"
disagrees with the jury's evaluation of the conflicting testimony.10
This Comment will discuss the reasons for the Tibbs Court
ruling that a retrial is not prohibited by the double jeopardy clause
if it is the result of an appellate court reversal based on inadequate
evidentiary weight.1 1 This Comment will attempt to demonstrate,
through an analysis of Tibbs, the paradoxical relationship between
weight and sufficiency in cases where the evidence has been judged
inadequate to sustain a conviction.12
In Tibbs, the use of the weight/sufficiency dichotomy may be
7. Id. at 16.
8. 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
9. Id. at 39-40.
10. Id. at 40-41.
11. For a discussion of the impact of the Tibbs decision see generally Note, A Retreat
in Double Jeopardy Policy: Tibbs v. Florida, 24 B.C.L. REV. 771 (1983); Note, Double Jeop-
ardy: Retrial After Reversal of a Conviction on Evidentiary Grounds, 43 LA. L. REV. 1061
(1983); Note, Fifth Amendment-Twice Jeopardizing The Rights of The Accused: The Su-
preme Court's Tibbs and Kennedy Decisions, 73 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1474 (1982).
12. In distinguishing weight from sufficiency it has been held that sufficient evidence is
"such evidence as in amount is adequate to justify the court or jury in adopting the conclu-
sion in support of which it was adduced. Evidence is sufficient if it is such as to satisfy an
unprejudiced mind." 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1016 (1964). Weight of the evidence, on the
other hand,
has been said to signify that the parol proof on one side of a cause is greater
than the other; that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to a
verdict, if, on weighing the evidence, it is found that the greater amount of cred-
itable evidence sustains the issue which is to be established.
Id. See generally 9 WIGMORE ON EVMENCE §§ 2494-96 (rev. ed. 1981); 30 AM. JuR. 2D Evi-
dence § 1080. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356 (1972). See infra note 30.
[Vol. 32
TIBBS V. FLORIDA
viewed in two ways, one specious, the other arguably valid. From
an evidentiary point of view, the concepts of weight and sufficiency
by themselves do not explain adequately why retrial is allowed
when the evidence as a whole is inadequate to sustain a conviction.
When an appellate court reviews evidence and finds it to be inade-
quate, any distinction made on either weight or sufficiency may in-
deed be specious. However, by scrutinizing the weight of evidence
presented below, as well as its sufficiency, the appellate court may
in fact be assuming a role independent of its function as a reviewer
of evidence. Consideration of the weight of the evidence allows an
appellate court to possess some dominion kover the jury and also to
consider the discretionary factors incident to a decision to retry.
This second role of the appellate court is what validates the
weight/sufficiency distinction.
I. THE FACTS: Tibbs v. Florida
In Tibbs v. Florida, the state charged the petitioner with rape
and with the murder of the rape victim's companion. Tibbs was
convicted in a Florida jury trial. On appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court noted certain infirmities in the evidence at trial which cast
doubt on the credibility of the victim's testimony and on the sub-
stantiality of the state's evidence in placing Tibbs at the scene of
the crime. 13 These evidentiary weaknesses, coupled with the fact
that Tibbs received the death sentence, persuaded the Florida Su-
preme Court to reverse his conviction and remand the case for a
new trial.1 '
13. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 789, 790-91 (Fla. 1976). The Florida Supreme Court
found the State's case weak in six areas: First, except for the victim's testimony, the State
introduced no evidence placing Tibbs in or near Fort Myers on the day of the crimes. Sec-
ond, although the rape victim gave a detailed description of the assailant's truck, police
never found the vehicle. Third, police discovered neither a gun nor car keys in Tibbs' pos-
session. Fourth, Tibbs cooperated fully with the police when he was stopped and arrested.
Fifth, the State introduced no evidence casting doubt on Tibbs'. veracity. Tibbs, on the
other hand, produced witnesses who attested to his good reputation. Sixth, the rape victim's
testimony was suspect since she smoked marijuana shortly before the crimes and because
her assertion that the crimes took place during the daylight conflicted with other evidence
suggesting the events occured after nightfall. 457 U.S. at 36-37.
14. The Florida Supreme Court reversed pursuant to FLA. APP. R. 6.16(b) (1962), recod-
ified as FLA. APP. R. 9.140(f), which states in relevant part. "Upon an appeal from the judg-
ment by a defendant who has been sentenced to death the appellate court shall review the
evidence to determine if the interests of justice require a new trial, whether the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence is a ground of appeal or not." (emphasis added).
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At retrial, Tibbs successfully moved for dismissal on the
ground that a new trial would violate the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment.15 However, the intermediate appellate court
reversed, stating that the original reversal of Tibbs' conviction by
the Florida Supreme Court was not "on the basis of pure insuffi-
ciency of the evidence but rather was premised upon the majority's
view that the evidence was inherently weak and seriously contra-
dicted ... ."I' The Florida Supreme Court affirmed this decision,
stating that when it had reversed and remanded the case almost
five years earlier, the reason for doing so had indeed been that the
weight of the state's evidence was tenuous and insubstantial.1 7
Consequently, since reversal was not based on insufficiency of the
evidence but rather on its insubstantial weight, the arguments
used by Tibbs to bar retrial after a reversal of conviction were
inapplicable."'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ad-
dressed the question of whether retrying a defendant violated the
double jeopardy clause if the conviction was reversed based upon
the weight of the evidence.19 In affirming the decision of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, the Court refused to extend the rule enunci-
ated in Burks v. United States20 which states that retrial is barred
when a court reverses a decision due to the insufficiency of the
evidence.21
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING AND RATIONALE
By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court held that when a
conviction is reversed and remanded, based on the weight of the
evidence, it falls within the rule that a defendant who successfully
15. See supra note 1.
16. State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
17. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1127 (Fla. 1981).
18. In arguing that retrial would violate the double jeopardy clause, the petitioner cited
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978). In
Burks, the United States Supreme Court ruled that in cases where a conviction is reversed
due to the insufficiency of the evidence the state has failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Since a new trial would provide the prosecution with a second opportunity to furnish
evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction, retrial is barred by the double jeopardy clause.
Greene applied the ruling in Burks to the states. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying
text.
19. 457 U.S. at 39-47.
20. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
21. Id. at 18.
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appeals is subject to retrial.22 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Court, reviewed the rationale behind this well-established rule, and
found that society would pay too high a price "were every accused
granted immunity from punishment because of any defect suffi-
cient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to
conviction." 23 Additionally, the Court stated that a retrial after a
reversal of a conviction is not the type of governmental oppression
meant to be precluded by the double jeopardy clause.24
An exception to this rule allowing retrial after a defendant's
successful appeal was created by the Court in the companion cases
of Burks v. United States and Greene v. Massey.25 In these cases,
the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause precludes
retrial when a reversal of a conviction is based on the insufficiency
of the evidence presented by the state. The Court found that in
cases where evidence is not sufficient to sustain a conviction, ac-
quittal is the only proper verdict, and that this was a necessary
conclusion regardless of whether the case was reviewed by an ap-
pellate or trial court.
26
The "insufficiency" exception is premised on two considera-
tions. The first is that the double jeopardy clause attaches more
importance to judgments of acquittal than judgments of convic-
tion. Second, the double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial for
the purpose of giving the prosecution a second chance to present
new evidence in order to win a conviction.2
In Tibbs, however, the Court held that the petitioner's case
did not fall within the realm of this "insufficiency" exception. The
Court stated instead that when an appellate court reverses a con-
viction, and bases that decision on the weight of the evidence, the
court is sitting as a "thirteenth juror" and disagrees with the jury's
resolution of conflicting testimony. In contrast, if an appellate
22. 457 U.S. at 39-40 (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896)).
23. 457 U.S. at 40 (quoting Justice Harlan in Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)). In
Burks, Chief Justice Burger asserts that this is the most reasonable justification. 437 U.S. at
15.
24. 457 U.S. at 40.
25. See supra note 18. In Burks, Chief Justice Burger held that in insufficiency of evi-
dence cases there must be an exception because "such an appellate reversal means that the
government's case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury."
437 U.S. at 16 (emphasis original).
26. 457 U.S. at 40-42.
27. Id. at 41.
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court rules that the evidence is insufficient, it is also ruling, in ef-
fect, that the evidence should never have been submitted to the
jury, and that a directed verdict of acquittal would have been
proper.2 8 The Court held that in the former case, the double jeop-
ardy clause is not violated by retrial, since such a disagreement
between judge and jury does not imply that acquittal was the only
proper verdict. Consequently, the deference accorded verdicts of
acquittal is not present. Furthermore, the Court noted, a new trial
would not be permitting the government a second chance to "wear
the defendant down," since the prosecution has already met its
burden.2 9 Therefore, a second trial would not amount to the gov-
ernmental oppression prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.
For these reasons, the Tibbs Court held that when a defen-
dant's conviction is reversed and remanded, because of inadequate
evidentiary weight, the accused will fall within the rule that a de-
fendant who successfully appeals a conviction is subject to retrial.
The Court distinguished between "weight" and "sufficiency" cases,
thus justifying the exclusion from the established exception to the
general rule.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that in order
to convict, the prosecution must satisfy both the federal standard
of sufficiency of evidence"0 and a state standard based on weight of
the evidence. In Tibbs, since no procedural error at trial prevented
the state from presenting its best case, the reversal meant that the
state simply failed to present evidence adequate to sustain a con-
viction. Morever, retrial, barred under federal law, should also be
barred under state law; in both "the interests of the State in over-
coming the evidentiary insufficiency of its case would seem to be
exactly the same. . . the interests of the defendant in avoiding a
second trial would also seem to be exactly the same .
28. Id. at 42.
29. Id. at 44.
30. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), reh'g denied 444 U.S. 890 (1979), the
Supreme Court ruled upon a challenge to a state conviction brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1977). The Court held that a federal habeas corpus court must consider not whether there
was any evidence to support a state conviction, but whether there was sufficient evidence to
justify a rational trier of fact's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court ap-
plied the standard of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), formulated in Davis v. United
States, 160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895), where it was held that the due process clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact neces-
sary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
31. 457 U.S. at 49.
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In responding to the majority's contention that the double
jeopardy clause "attaches special weight to judgments of acquit-
tal,"32 Justice White maintained that in neither insufficiency nor
inadequate weight cases has there been an actual acquittal by the
initial factfinder. Therefore, it is not essential that "acquittal be
the only proper verdict."33 However, regardless of whether acquit-
tal is the only proper verdict, the fact remains that at trial the
state failed to meet the evidentiary requirements of state law in
order to win a conviction. Allowing retrial in this case would
counter the policy considerations in Burks and Greene and "would
unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction
through sheer governmental perseverance."-"'
Justice White asserted that given these considerations the
only proper distinction to be made is that between procedure and
evidence. Where the former is fraught with error, retrial would be
permitted. If the latter is deemed inadequate to win a conviction,
retrial would be barred. 5 In light of Justice White's dissent, the
material issue presented by Tibbs, then, is whether the weight of
the evidence should be treated differently from its sufficiency.
Under both "weight" and "sufficiency" analyses, evidence may not
be adequate to win a conviction. That the Supreme Court uses the
classification of weight to permit retrial raises the question of
whether the failure of evidence due to its lack of weight is materi-
ally different from a failure due to insufficiency. 6 Also, because the
question of weight necessarily involves the participation of the jury
in evaluating the evidence, the jury and the judge-the thirteenth
juror-become the focal point in studying the possible distinction
between weight and sufficiency in the area of appellate review.
32. Id. (quoting the majority opinion at 41).
33. Id. (quoting the majority opinion at 42).
34. Id. at 50 (quoting the majority opinion at 41).
35. Id. at 50-51.
36. This is precisely the dilemma that plagued the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida
Supreme Court "resolved" the issue by holding that "weight" cases would be left exclusively
to the trial judge and jury and would no longer be open to appellate review. Tibbs v. State,
397 So. 2d at 1125.
1983]
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III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY BACKGROUND IN THE
APPELLATE REVIEW AREA
A. Early Disorder
In the preface to his dissent in Tibbs, Justice White noted
that the meaning of the double jeopardy clause as applied to ap-
pellate review has not always been readily apparent.37 The general
meaning and intent of the double jeopardy clause may be revealed
through a cursory examination of its historical development, as
presented by a variety of sources "ranging from legal maxims to
casual references in contemporary commentary.
'3 8
The implications of the double jeopardy clause are clear when
the defendant has been acquitted at trial.39 Retrial would put the
37. 457 U.S. at 47. The cases cited by Justice White support this contention. In Bryan
v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950), it was held that a United States Court of Appeals
could give directions upon remand where the evidence was insufficient under the authority
of section 2106 of the New Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1977), rather than being bound
by FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 requiring a judgment of acquittal. The ruling in Sapir v. United
States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955), disallowed a Court of Appeals' judgment directing a new trial
when new evidence had been discovered after it made a prior judgment dismissing the in-
dictment. Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960), held that a United States Court of
Appeals could modify its original order of dismissal and enter one requiring a new trial since
the original order was interlocutory ind not final, and the appellate court was acting within
its power in directing such "appropriate" order as it thought was "just under the circum-
stances." 361 U.S. at 424. In each of these cases the Supreme Court considered the remedy
sought by the defendant, i.e., whether or not a new trial was sought on appeal. In overruling
the lower court decision in Burks, Chief Justice Burger noted that these holdings could
hardly be characterized as models of consistency:
Bryan seemingly stood for the proposition that an appellate court could order
whatever relief was "appropriate" or "equitable" regardless of what considera-
tions prompted reversal. A somewhat different course was taken by the concur-
rence in Sapir, where it was suggested that a reversal for evidentiary insuffi-
ciency would require a judgment of acquittal unless the defendant had
requested a new trial .... While not completely resolving these ambiguities,
Forman suggested that a reviewing court could go beyond the relief requested by
a defendant and order a new trial under some circumstances.
437 U.S. at 9-10 (emphasis in original). See infra note 49.
38. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
39. Perhaps one of the earliest references made to the idea that double punishment for
the same offense is morally reprehensible, if not legally so, was by the Old Testament
prophet, Nahum: "What do ye devise against the Lord? He will make an utter end; there
shall not rise a double affliction." Nahum 1:9 (emphasis added). St. Jerome continued the
theme, saying: "Happy the man who is chastised in this life, for the Lord will not punish
twice for the same thing." 1 ST. JEROME, HommLi.s ON THE PsALMs 368 (emphasis added).
See also 2 id. at 12. This principle was also accepted as a universal maxim of the common
law of England. In using the term of "jeopardy" to characterize the two pleas of autrefois
19831 TIBBS V. FLORIDA
defendant in the vulnerable position of possible conviction after it
had already been determined that he or she was not criminally re-
sponsible.40 Different concerns arise, however, when a defendant
appeals a conviction.4' It has been suggested that by appealing, a
defendant actually waives the protection of the double jeopardy
clause in an effort to secure a favorable judgment. 2 In his dissent
in Kepner v. United States,43 Justice Holmes rejected this "waiver
theory" on the grounds that it could not "be imagined that the law
would deny to a prisoner the correction of a fatal error unless he
should waive other rights so important as to be saved by an ex-
press clause in the Constitution."' 44 Perhaps the most viable expla-
nation for the allowance of an appeal and retrial is the view that it
is but a continuation of both the jeopardy and the proceeding from
which the appeal arises.45
acquit (former acquittal) and autrefois convict (former conviction), Blackstone wrote that
"no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life for more than once for the same offense."
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARmS *335-36 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE]. For a histori-
cal treatment of the development of the double jeopardy concept, see generally Sigler, A
History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1963).
40. In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), reh'g denied 439 U.S. 883 (1979),
Justice Rehnquist recognized that "in cases from Ball to Sanabria v. United States, a defen-
dant once acquitted may not be again subjected to trial without violating the double jeop-
ardy clause." 437 U.S. at 96. This was justified by
[t]he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-Ameri-
can system of jurisprudence. . . that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal,
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity...
437 U.S. at 86 (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 187 (1957)).
41. These concerns were evident during the debate over James Madison's early version
of the double jeopardy clause at the First Session of Congress. Several members of the
House objected to Madison's wording: "[N]o person shall be subject except in cases of im-
peachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense." These members
of the House did not want this wording to be construed so as to foreclose a defendant from
seeking a new trial on his appeal of his conviction. Despite the assurances of Madison's
supporters, the Senate ultimately changed the wording to read simply "jeopardy." Both
sides agreed that in cases where a defendant was acquitted at the first trial he or she should
not be tried a second time. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 753 (1789) (noted in United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. at 340-42). See also Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 40 n.14; Bigelow, Former Conviction
and Former Acquittal, 11 RUTtRS L. REv. 487 (1957).
42. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533 (1905).
43. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
44. Id. at 135. See also Green, 355 U.S. at 219 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
45. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *393. Blackstone also suggested that in cases where
a judgment was reversed on a writ of error, the accused was subject to being tried again on
the theory that since the first prosecution had been erroneous, no jeopardy had ever at-
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The reasoning behind appellate reversals in the double jeop-
ardy area has been elusive, vague, and inconsistent.4 Beginning
with the landmark case of United States v. Ball,4 and continuing
through the decision in United States v. Tateo,48 the Supreme
Court decided appellate reversal cases in an ad hoc manner.49 Ball
tached. Id. See also Meyers and Yarbrough, supra note 3 at 7; Comment, Appeals By the
State in Criminal Proceedings, 47 YALE L.J. 489, 492 (1938).
46. See supra note 37.
47. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). In ascertaining a "common ancestor" to the cases at issue,
Chief Justice Burger said Ball would provide a logical starting point "since Ball appears to
represent the first instance in which this Court considered in any detail the double jeopardy
implications of an appellate reversal." 437 U.S. at 13. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 719-20 (1969).
48. 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
49. In Ball, three men had been indicted on murder charges. Two were convicted while
the third was acquitted by a jury in federal circuit court. The two defendants found guilty
appealed on writ of error saying that the indictment was insufficient. Their conviction was
reversed and, on remand, a new indictment charged all three with murder. The Supreme
Court held that the two defendants whose convictions had been reversed could not plead
double jeopardy to the reindictment. The Court rather intuitively stated that the former
verdict and sentence need not be considered "because it is quite clear that a defendant who
procures a judgment against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew,
upon the same indictment. . . for the same offense of which he had been convicted." 163
U.S. at 672. It should also be noted that with regard to the defendant who had originally
been acquitted the Court strongly maintained that the double jeopardy clause barred his
reindictment: "The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed, on error or
otherwise, without putting him twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution."
Id. at 671. Regarding the finality of the acquittal, see Westen, supra note 3, at 1008.
In the case of Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950), the petitioner was convicted
by jury of an attempt to evade the income tax laws and moved for acquittal or, alterna-
tively, for a new trial pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, still
in effect, which states in relevant part:
(a) Motion before Submission to Jury.. The court on motion of a defen-
dant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or
more offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such
offense or offenses .
(c) Motion after Discharge of Jury. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or
is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of ac-
quittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or
within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period ....
The trial court denied the motion but the appellate court reversed and remanded, holding
the evidence insufficient. The petitioner contended that under Rule 29, the Court of Ap-
peals must acquit since the evidence was insufficient and the trial court would have had to
acquit on proper motion. The Supreme Court held that Rule 29 applied only to the district
courts. The appellate courts are empowered to "remand the cause and direct the entry of
such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had
as may be just under the circumstances." 338 U.S. at 557 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106). There-
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and its progeny recognized that an appellate court's reversal of a
fore, unlike Ball, where remand for trial was based on trial error, i.e., failure to dismiss a
faulty indictment, the Court in Bryan reversed and remanded based on insufficient evi-
dence. Without articulating this distinction, the Bryan Court affirmed the idea that in cases
"where the accused successfully seeks review of a conviction, there is no double jeopardy
upon a new trial." 338 U.S. at 560. This is essentially the thought espoused in Ball and
adhered to in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947) and Trono v.
United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533-34 (1905).
Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955), was inconsistent with Bryan. In Sapir, the
Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals could not remand the case for trial since the
reversal was based on insufficient evidence. This, however, had been allowed in Bryan. The
double jeopardy waters were further muddied by the concurrence of Justice Douglas. In
intimating that this case was different from Bryan, where the petitioner alternatively moved
for a new trial, Justice Douglas said that "if petitioner [Sapir] had asked for a new trial,
different considerations would come into play.. . ." Id. at 374.
In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) the Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tions of fourteen defendants who were charged with conspiracy. The Court remanded the
case to the district court with directions to enter judgments of acquittal for some of the
defendants on the ground that the evidence would be "palpably insufficient" to justify a
new trial. The evidence would not be insufficient as to the other defendants and therefore a
new trial would be in order. Id. at 328-29. In making the latter determination the Court
considered the petitioners' request, in the alternative, for a new trial. Id. Yates, therefore,
implicitly applied both Justice Douglas' accounting of a request for a new trial by petitioner
in Sapir and the Supreme Court's discretionary powers under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, as stated in
Bryan. Using both reasons, the Yates Court could either grant a new trial or acquit.
The boundary lines of double jeopardy and appellate reversal were further obscured in
Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960) and United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463
(1964). In Forman, the Court affirmed a Court of Appeals order directing a new trial in the
case of trial error. Dismissing the petitioner's argument that because he had not requested a
new trial one should not be meted out, the Court maintained that 28 U.S.C. § 2106 gives the
Court of Appeals "full power to go beyond the particular relief sought." 361 U.S. at 425. The
Court rejected the notion that, like Sapir, petitioner's case was one of insufficient evidence.
Rather, the jury was simply not properly instructed and "when petitioner opened up the
case by appealing from his conviction, he subjected himself to the power of the appellate
court to direct such 'appropriate' order as it thought 'just' under the circumstances." Id. at
426. This "Ball-§ 2106" reasoning would allow for a new trial.
In Tateo, the defendant's plea of guilty had been instigated through remarks made by
the trial judge. In later proceedings in the same federal district court, it was found that this
plea could not have been made voluntarily and that reindictment of the charges would vio-
late the double jeopardy clause. 377 U.S. at 464-66. The Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Harlan, recognized that the remark made by the trial judge spurring the guilty plea
foreclosed any exercise of the jury and amounted to procedural error. Although this proce-
dural error denied the defendant a jury verdict, the Court said such denial did not differ
from a jury's finding of guilt in an unfair trial. If procedural error was the cause in both
instances, then "the distinction between the two kinds of wrongs affords no sensible basis
for differentiation with regard to retrial." Id. at 467. In contrasting Bryan, the Court inti-
mated that insufficiency of evidence was a stronger argument for acquittal, as opposed to
retrial:
[Tateo's] argument is considerably less strong than a similar one rejected in
Bryan v. United States.... In that case, the Court held that despite the Court
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defendant's conviction with directions for retrial is a concept born
of the common law, and supported by the policy consideration that
any reversible error should not irrevocably bar society from pun-
ishing the guilty.50 These cases, however, did not delineate specifi-
cally which types of cases warranted reversal and retrial. Depend-
ing on the particular case, considerations were given to several
factors or combinations of factors, such as whether the defendant
requested retrial in his relief; whether the reversal was based on
insufficient evidence; or whether the reversal was based on trial er-
ror. In any event, application of and justification for an appellate
court's decision to reverse a conviction and direct a new trial had
been performed in a somewhat unpredictable fashion.
B. Line Drawing Between Procedural and Evidentiary Errors:
Burks v. United States
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify these issues through
its decision in Burks v. United States.5 1 In that case, the trial
court denied the defendant's motion for acquittal before the evi-
dence was submitted to the jury. The court also denied his subse-
quent motion for acquittal after the jury rendered a verdict of
guilty. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit later reversed
the conviction with direction for retrial.52 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that when a conviction is reversed due to the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence, retrial would violate the double jeopardy
clause. 3
of Appeals' determination that defendant had been entitled - because of insuf-
ficiency of the evidence - to a directed verdict of acquittal, reversal of the con-
viction with a direction for a new trial was a permissible disposition.
Id. In permitting retrial, the Court explained the policy considerations implicated by Ball,
and stated that the "right of an accused to be given a fair trial" corresponded to "the socie-
tal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he obtained such a trial." Id. at 466.
See supra text accompanying note 23.
50. It had been suggested that Ball had merely paraphrased Blackstone's rationale that
the defendant "remains liable to another prosecution for the same offense; for the first being
erroneous he never was in jeopardy thereby." Thompson, Reversals for Insufficient Evi-
dence: The Emerging Doctrine of Appellate Acquittal, 8 IND. L. REV. 497, 503-04 (1975).
Justice Harlan's policy justification is the generally recognized reason for allowing retrial.
Burks, 437 U.S. at 15.
51. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
52. Id. at 2-4.
53. Id. at 17-18. For a discussion of this case see Case Comment, Double Jeopardy
Implications of Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence; Burks v. United States, 25
N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rv. 119 (1979).
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In resolving Burks and the confusion created by the prior de-
cisions in this area, the Court first distinguished between cases
where the conviction was reversed because of procedural error and
those reversed because of insufficient evidence.6 ' The Court held
that a reversal based on procedural error at trial should not be
barred because the government is not being given a second chance
to prove its case and, as a policy matter, "the accused has a strong
interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from er-
ror, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the
guilty are punished.
'55
The Court found that the considerations differ when the evi-
dence is insufficient, as in Burks. In such a case, the trial court
actually errs in allowing the evidence to be presented to the jury.
Consequently, the appellate court is performing the task the trial
court should have performed, i.e., rendering a judgment of acquit-
tal." Unlike trial error, where the prosecution has been denied a
fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble, a case of
insufficient evidence recognizes that the government was given a
fair opportunity but failed to submit the evidence needed for con-
viction.57 Society could not have a greater interest than the defen-
dant when, as here, "it is decided as a matter of law, that the jury
could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."58
Since insufficient evidence cases properly require an acquittal,
it became immaterial whether or not the defendant requested a
new trial. Simply put, such a request no longer had any import
since it could not meaningfully be said that a defendant could
waive his right to a judgment of acquittal by moving for a new
trial.5 9
54. 437 U.S. at 13-17.
55. Id. at 15. But see Thompson, supra note 50, at 506 n.24, where it is argued that in
prosecuting the defendant, the government assumes all risks of prosecutorial error, includ-
ing trial error and insufficiency of evidence. If the double jeopardy clause is to preclude
multiple prosecutions without regard to the question of guilt, then the grounds for reversal
would be immaterial.
56. 437 U.S. at 10-11. See also Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Sapir, 348 U.S.
at 374.
57. Burks, 437 U.S. at 16.
58. Id. An interesting problem may arise in cases where trial error has rendered evi-
dence insufficient. In such overlapping cases, the Court has intimated that they will be
treated in the context of trial error, thereby permitting retrial. See Case Comment, supra
note 53, at 130.
59. Burks, 437 U.S. at 17.
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C. The Tibbs Exception
Burks created this distinction between trial error and insuffi-
cient evidence in appellate review cases. The Florida District Court
of Appeals decision in State v. Tibbs allowing retrial after a rever-
sal of a conviction based on the weight of the evidence, carved out
a third category of appellate reversals.6 0 The Florida Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court were subsequently
faced with the question of how this third category-evidentiary
weight-was to be treated. The Burks rationale of not allowing a
retrial could not be applied in this type of case, where the defen-
dant has been convicted on sufficient evidence in an error-free jury
trial. This was not a case where the evidence should never have
been submitted to the jury. Nor was it a case where the govern-
ment would be prosecuting an "acquitted" defendant. Therefore,
unlike insufficient evidence cases where the defendant is construc-
tively acquitted, the reasons posed for prohibiting retrial were not
applicable here."'
The justifications given for allowing retrial in procedural error
cases similarly failed to provide any guidance for the resolution of
the issue posed in Tibbs. Unlike trial error cases, where the defen-
dant has been denied a fair trial and is interested in obtaining one,
60. In Tibbs, the petitioner's original conviction was reversed for a new trial by the
Florida Supreme Court on the grounds that the evidence was unsatisfactory. Tibbs v. State,
337 So. 2d 789 (1976). On remand, the petitioner argued that the 1976 reversal was based on
insufficient evidence and according to the then newly decided Burks and Greene cases, he
could not be reindicted. The trial court agreed and granted his motion to dismiss the indict-
ment against him. On certiorari, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, not on insuf-
ficiency of evidence, but on inadequate weight. State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386 (1979). The
Florida Supreme Court was thus faced with the problem of deciding what the specific
grounds were for its reversal in 1976, and whether this third category of appellate reversals
would be recognized. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (1981).
61. At least the Florida Supreme Court found it problematic. The court first found it
necessary to go over the evidentiary questions of past cases it ruled on to determine if the
issue was one of weight or sufficiency. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1124-25. The cases
treated by the court were: Williams v. State, 58 FI. 138, 50 So. 749 (1909); McNeil v. State,
104 Fla. 360, 139 So. 791 (1932); Woodward v. State, 113 Fla. 301, 151 So. 509 (1933); Skiff
v. State, 107 Fla. 90, 144 So. 323 (1932); Fuller v. State, 92 Fla. 873, 110 So. 528 (1926);
Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730, 19 So. 106 (1944); Sosa v. Maxwell, 234 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970); and Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Determining that
Tibbs was indeed a "weight" case, the court opted to treat it as a pre-Burks appellate rever-
sal and allow retrial. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1124-25. Burks made it clear that only
those appellate reversals tantamount to an acquittal due to insufficient evidence would pro-
hibit retrial. Since this rule was not applicable to the case at bar, no double jeopardy princi-
ples were implicated. 437 U.S. at 16.
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weight-of-the-evidence cases presume a fair trial has transpired.62
In a "weight" case, the state has presented sufficient evidence to
support conviction and has persuaded the jury to convict. The trial
judge or appellate court, sitting as a "thirteenth juror," disagrees
with the jury verdict, thus creating a "hung" jury and a need for
retrial.63 Under the circumstances of this type of reversal, the
Court's majority deemed that retrial simply affords the defendant
a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment."
The impact of Tibbs is that distinctions between these three
types of reversals will be determinative on the issue of whether
double jeopardy protection will be extended in a certain case. The
distinctions are subtle, however. Retrial is allowed in procedural
error cases because it is in the defendant's interest to receive a fair
trial and in society's interest not to acquit for reversible error. Re-
trial is not allowed in insufficiency-of-evidence cases because the
defendant has been constructively acquitted and a new trial would
be granting the state a "second bite of the apple," a notion repul-
sive to the double jeopardy clause. The Tibbs Court created a third
rule: retrial is allowed when the evidentiary weight is insubstantial,
because reweighing the evidence is neither tantamount to saying
the trial was unfair nor equivalent to a constructive acquittal. The
Supreme Court reasoned that, unlike the defendant who has an
interest in correcting past trial error through retrial, or the defen-
dant who has no interest in retrial if constructively acquitted, the
defendant in a "weight" case has nothing to lose except his
conviction. 5
62. 457 U.S. at 42-43.
63. As Justice Powell noted in Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981), the matter of
whether or not a trial judge may sit as a "thirteenth juror" and assess the evidence in the
same manner as the jury is a question of state law. Id. at 43-44 nn.4-5. Similarly, appellate
review in the "interest of justice" is also a matter of state legislation. See supra note 14 and
infra note 93. The federal counterpart can be interpreted to be Rule 33 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. See Amicus Curiae Brief on the Merits for the United States in
Tibbs, Docket #81-5114.
In reviewing the weight of the evidence as the "thirteenth juror" the judge and appellate
court constructively create a deadlocked jury. Although Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure allows for a judgment of acquittal when the jury has failed to reach a
verdict, the Supreme Court has ruled that such a deadlock does not necessarily result in an
acquittal barring retrial. 457 U.S. at 42 n.17.
64. Id. at 43.
65. Id. The Court implies that the good graces of the appellate court grant the defen-
dant a second chance of avoiding conviction by saying- "The reversal simply affords the
defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment. An appellate court's decision
1983]
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Justice White's dissent and the Florida Supreme Court's opin-
ion raise several interesting questions regarding the nature of these
distinctions and the weight-of-the-evidence argument itself.
D. Questions Raised by the Tibbs Exception
Justice White intimated that if sufficient evidence under the
Jackson standard" is proof beyond reasonable doubt of each ele-
ment of the crime charged, the question posed by Tibbs should be
whether the evidence presented proved guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Since the Florida Supreme Court ruled under the "weight"
argument that the evidence was inadequate to sustain a convic-
tion,6 7 it necessarily follows that such evidence could not prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and consequently should be
deemed insufficient as a matter of law. Therefore, the dissent
maintained, Burks should apply and retrial would be barred.68
Making a distinction of evidentiary weight would not appear to be
helpful in resolving the retrial issue.
The weight distinction would also create problems if the case
actually was retried. If the evidence is said to be already sufficient,
no new evidence need be offered at retrial by the state." If the
defendant would again be found guilty on the same evidence, the
appellate court would necessarily reverse and remand a second
time. Theoretically, this could go on ad infinitum.
70
The weight distinction would also have an adverse impact
upon the criminal justice system. Appellate courts would elect to
reverse on the grounds of inadequate weight, rather than insuffi-
to give the defendant this second chance does not create 'an unacceptably high risk that
the Government, with its superior resources, [will] wear down [the] defendant.' "Id. (empha-
sis added).
66. See supra note 30.
67. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1127.
68. 457 U.S. at 47-48.
69. On retrial, the state is left with the option of using the same evidence or adding new
evidence. Although the uncovering of new evidence is a possibility, the more likely event is
that the old evidence will have lost its admissibility or effectiveness, particularly in light of
the fact that the retrial in Tibbs would transpire eight years after the occurrence of the
alleged rape and murder. If the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the testimony at the first
trial lacked credibility, it would seem somewhat difficult to believe that testimony could be
more credible years later at retrial.
70. 457 U.S. at 50. The majority countered by stating that although infinite regression
is a theoretical possibility, the "interests of justice" argument would preclude an appellate
court from repeated reversals of the jury verdict. Id. at 43 n.18.
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ciency, so that retrial would be imposed.7 1 The anomalous notion
would be lurking about that appellate courts may agree on the suf-
ficiency of the evidence and yet be inclined to disagree with the
trial judge and jury as to its weight.7
2
The Florida Supreme Court seemed to recognize similar para-
doxes, although it allowed the weight argument. Chief Justice
Sundberg, who concurred in part and dissented in part, foretold
Justice White's concerns by stating that the weight distinction was
not helpful. He argued that the real issue was whether the case
should be categorized as trial error or evidentiary insufficiency.
Sundberg asserted that the state's failure to identify Tibbs as the
perpetrator of the murder and rape was most certainly a question
of evidentiary insufficiency,73 and that the Florida Supreme Court
simply lacked the authority to reweigh the evidence; it could only
pass upon its insufficiency.74
These complications prompted the Florida Supreme Court
majority to rule that a Florida appellate court would no longer be
allowed to review questions of evidentiary weight: "Elimination of
the third category of reversal accords Florida appellate courts their
proper role in examining the sufficiency of the evidence, while leav-
ing questions of weight for resolution only before the trier of
fact."
75
The issues dealt with in Tibbs by the Florida courts and the
United States Supreme Court centered exclusively on the ade-
quacy of the evidence, and on an appellate court's duty, as a "thir-
teenth juror," to review this evidence. In this role as "thirteenth
juror," the appellate court may disagree with the jury as to the
adequacy of the evidence based on weight. But by stating that the
evidentiary question is one of weight and not sufficiency, the ap-
pellate court merely begs the question of why retrial should be al-
lowed. Instead, the court artificially constructs a "weight loop-
hole," to be implemented in those difficult cases where the
evidence may or may not be insufficient. In these difficult cases,
71. Id. at 50-51.
72. Id.
73. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1127-30.
74. Id. at 1127.
75. Id. at 1125. Having reviewed its prior decisions, the Florida Supreme Court con-
cluded that the "weight" argument "has a questionable historical foundation." Id. See
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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the appellate court may choose weight over insufficiency as a way'
of resolving the uncertainty. Rather than allowing a possibly guilty
defendant to go free, the court may opt for a retrial, believing that
a replay of the case will result in a just verdict of either guilt or
innocence. 76 However, the irrefutable determination in the difficult
cases where retrial is selected is that the evidence is inadequate to
sustain the conviction because it did not prove guilt beyond rea-
sonable doubt.77 Therefore, the role the appellate court assumes as
a reviewer of evidence in the form of the "thirteenth juror" fails to
fully explain the Tibbs decision.
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW AND THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WEIGHT-OF-
THE-EVIDENCE ARGUMENT
A. The Role of the Jury, Trial Judges, and Appellate Court
When the appellate court is viewed solely as a reviewer of evi-
dence, the Tibbs decision appears to be nothing more than an evi-
dentiary loophole fueling the criticism that appellate courts will
now use the weight doctrine to permit retrials in cases where the
uncertainty of the evidence may be tantamount to insufficiency.
Perhaps the Tibbs decision is valid, however, when an additional
role of the appellate court, inherent in the "weight" rubric, is ex-
plored. This other role involves the court's control over the jury
and the necessary considerations used in exercising such control.
76. See Note, Double Jeopardy: Retrial After Reversal of a Conviction on Evidentiary
Grounds, supra note 11, at 1072 n.80; see infra text accompanying note 80; see also Tibbs v.
State, 397 So. 2d at 1125-26, where the Supreme Court of Florida held that by precluding
further appellate reversals based on weight of the evidence it would be eliminating "any
temptation appellate tribunals might have to direct a retrial merely by styling reversals as
based on 'weight' when in fact there is a lack of competent substantial evidence to support
the verdict .... .
77. This is precisely Justice White's major point:
The majority concedes ... that if the State's evidence failed to meet the federal
due process standard of evidentiary sufficiency, the Double Jeopardy Clause
would bar reprosecution. The majority fails to explain why the State should be
allowed another try where its proof has been held inadequate on state law
grounds, when it could not do so were it inadequate on federal law grounds. In
both cases the State has failed to present evidence adequate to sustain the
conviction.
457 U.S. at 48-49 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The federal due process stan-
dard of evidentiary sufficiency is the reasonable doubt standard enunciated in Jackson. See
supra note 30.
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The Florida Supreme Court's decision to leave questions of
weight for the trier of fact explicates the fact-finding roles of the
jury, trial judge, and appellate court. In the Tibbs opinion, Justice
O'Connor distinguished a reversal based on weight from one based
on sufficiency by stating that in a weight case the "appellate court
sits as a 'thirteenth juror' and disagrees with the jury's resolution
of the conflicting testimony."78 This statement implies that the
trial judge and jury, as well as the review court, try the facts. A
closer analysis of this statement helps to explain the conceptual
difficulties encountered by the Tibbs courts in grappling with the
weight/sufficiency distinction and the role of the "thirteenth
juror."
As part of the jury's fact-finding mission, jurors must select
between contrary inferences which may be drawn from the evi-
dence, once the evidence has been found by the trial court to be
sufficient as a matter of law."' This fact-finding process also in-
cludes a juror's responsibility to determine the credibility and
weight of the testimony of witnesses."0
The function of the trial judge, on the other hand, is generally
78. 457 U.S. at 42.
79. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1138(a) (1961). The question as to whether the evidence
is legally sufficient to be submitted to the jury is a question of law for the court; but after it
is determined by the court that evidence is admissible and is sufficient to go the the jury,
the questions of its weight and of its sufficiency to establish the facts or issues are for the
jury. Id. See also cases cited supra note 26.
The jury is well-suited for this function because of its "good sense." The Morris Commit-
tee, in recommending basic linguistic and mental requirements that jurors should meet,
stated:
We think that in any healthy community there will be a high sense of duty, a
fundamental respect for law and order, and a wish that principles of honesty and
decency should prevail. A jury should represent a cross-section drawn at random
from the community, and should be the means of bringing to bear on the issues
that face them the corporate good sense of that commuity. This cannot be in
the keeping of the few, but is something to which all men and women of good
will must contribute.
W. CORNISH, THE JuRy 34-35 (1968) (quoting the Morris Report (Cmnd 2627) 11 53, 76-80).
See generally Browder, The Functions of the Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1954).
80. 30 Am. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1080 (1981); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1138(b) (1961).
In making such a determination the jury may take into account the demeanor of the witness
while on the stand, the witness's inability to comprehend the question or recollect an an-
swer, and the witness's opportunity to know the matter about which he is testifying. See,
e.g., Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d
110 (5th Cir. 1941). See also W. CORNISH, supra note 79, at 102-04, where the author exem-
plifies the jury's assessment of witness testimony under the legal constraints imposed by the
court.
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reserved to deciding questions of law, a province separate from
that of the fact-finding jury."" In attempting to assure a fair pres-
entation of the facts to the jury 2 the trial judge analyzes the evi-
dence, including testimony, in the same way the jury would. s3 In
short, the judge sits as a "thirteenth juror," and, depending upon
the state statutory law, may disagree with the jury's resolution of
the facts.84 In New York, for example, "disagreeing" with the jury
81. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1118 (1961). Once made, the judge's determination as to
the law should be applied by the jury to the facts. A. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JuRons:
THEIR FUNCTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SELECTION 3-4 (1956). Although this may appear to
be a separate-but-equal relationship between the judge and jury, the judge generally
reserves extensive powers of supervision over the jury. W. CORNISH, supra note 79, at 101.
This supervision is justified considering "the jury's lack of information as to the law and its
lack of experience in weighing the probative force of testimony." A. VANDERBILT, supra at
62. By so guiding the jury, the judge is attempting to separate questions of law from ques-
tions of fact so that the jury will be limited to only those factual issues in dispute. Id. at 61.
This attempt to demarcate questions of law and fact by the judge will generally create some
overlap in the responsibilities between the judge and jury. Whether the jury will actually be
deciding evidentiary questions of law or whether the judge will be deciding evidentiary
questions of fact is dependent upon the discretion of the trial judge as he applies the rules
of evidence. In England, for example, the crime of murder will be reduced to manslaughter
if it can be proved that the victim provoked his attacker. The legal standard for provocation
depends on whether the victim's acts were so gross that they would have "caused a reasona-
ble man to use violence with fatal results." W. CORNISH, supra note 79, at 104 (emphasis
original). Presumably, the gross acts of the victim would be a question of fact for the jury to
determine. Displeased with the ability of the jury to decide within such a broad standard,
the English judges enforced a strict rule that mere words could never constitute provoca-
tion. Id. Such an indoctrination by the English judges would seem to indicate the inclina-
tion to make "reasonableness" a less factual standard and a more legal one in these
circumstances.
Therefore, the precise amount of guidance a judge should give a jury depends upon op-
posing principles. Should the jury be given wide discretion in arriving at a verdict because it
is the "corporate good sense of the community" or would such wide discretion actually allow
"jury-made" law, that is, decisions made without precedent and without regard to what will
be done in similar cases in the future? A. VANDERBILT, supra, at 61-62. See also W. CORNISH,
supra note 79, at 101-25. See generally Comment, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52
HARv. L. REV. 582 (1939).
82. For a discussion of the manner in which a trial judge may assess evidence in deter-
mining its sufficiency and submission to the jury see James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and
Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218 (1961).
83. Note, Judicial Intervention in Trials, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 843, 844-45 (1973).
84. Hudson, 450 U.S. at 44 (1981). Although the jury in a criminal case has tradition-
ally been permitted to enter an unassailable but unreasonable verdict of not guilty, this
power of the fact finder to err upon the side of mercy has never been thought to include a
power to enter an unreasonable verdict of guilty. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317 n.10. See, e.g.,
Hudson, 450 U.S. at 41. In Hudson, the trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a new
trial after the jury verdict of guilty. In granting the motion the judge stated: "I heard the
same evidence the jury did . . . .I'm convinced that there was no evidence, certainly not
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by setting aside a guilty verdict is allowed, given the proper set of
circumstances:
In a particular criminal case, the evidence may be sufficient to require sub-
mission to a jury and yet be so unsatisfactory that a verdict of guilty would
be so against the weight of the evidence that it should be set aside. Where, on
the coming in of a verdict of guilty, the trial court consciensciously concludes
that the weight of the evidence does not support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the court should set aside a verdict of guilty and grant a
new trial. . . . If, by reason of the demeanor of the witness, a lack of cer-
tainty or inconsistencies in her testimony or other factors affecting the relia-
bility of her testimony, the trial judge was firmly persuaded that there was a
reasonable and proper basis for discrediting the witness's testimony, then, he
should have set aside the verdict of guilty and directed a new trial. .... 8.
Similarly, in California, the defendant is given "the benefit of [the
court's] independent conclusion as to the sufficiency of the credi-
ble evidence to support the verdict" after a jury verdict of guilty.8 6
The ability of a trial judge to retain discretionary control over
the evidence thus indicates that the functions of the fact-finding
jury and the law-resolving judge are not neatly demarcated. In
Tibbs, the Supreme Court went a step further and referred to the
appellate court as the "thirteenth juror," juxtaposing the function
of the jury with the scope of appellate review. 7 Although the Su-
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, to sustain the verdict...." Id.
85. People v. Ramos, 33 A.D.2d 344, 347, 308 N.Y.S.2d 195, 198 (1970). But see People
v. Noga, 586 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Colo. 1978), where the Supreme Court of Colorado took a
more restrictive view of the judge as "thirteenth juror," saying:
Thus, if a determination of the defendant's guilt rests upon the credibility of
witnesses or the weight to be accorded evidence, the case must be submitted to
the jury, for these matters are solely within its province .... The jury appar-
ently found the prosecution's witnesses to be more credible than the defendant's
because it returned a verdict of guilty .... A trial judge may never upset a
guilty verdict for the sole reason that if he were the finder of fact, he would have
ruled differently.
Id. at 1003.
86. Veitch v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 722, 731, 152 Cal. Rptr. 822, 827-28
(1979).
87. In Burks, the Court reaffirmed Justice Douglas' concurrence in Sapir by stating
that it makes "no difference that the reviewing court, rather than the trial court, deter-
mined the evidence to be insufficient." 437 U.S. at 11 (emphasis in Burks) (noting Sapir,
348 U.S. at 374). In Tibbs, the Court intimated that it made no difference because in cases
of insufficiency, acquittal is the only proper verdict. 457 U.S. at 43-44. Although the Court
did not address it, an interesting question arises in inadequate weight cases as to whether or
not it should make a difference if the trial court or reviewing court makes the determination
since acquittal would not be the only proper verdict.
The general maxim is that the appellate court should have nothing to do with the weight
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preme Court has at times expressed almost complete deference to
the jury in cases involving weight-of-the-evidence questions,"8 the
appellate courts have reserved the right to review the weight of the
evidence on grounds of due process of law. 9 The fact-finding
of the evidence, which is considered to be within the province of the jury. 24A C.J.S. Crimi-
nal Law § 1880 (1961); L. ORFmLD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 87 (1939).
88. "The alleged fact that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence we are
precluded from considering, if there was any evidence proper to go to the jury in support of
the verdict." Humes v. United States, 170 U.S. 210, 212-13 (1898); "[T]hat there was no
credible evidence to sustain the verdict. . . was for the jury, not for this court." Southwest-
em Brewery & Ice Co. v. Schmidt, 226 U.S. 162, 169 (1912); "It is not for us to weigh the
evidence or to determine the credibility of witnesses. The verdict of the jury must be sus-
tained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). See also Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690, 700-01 (1962); Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944);
The Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196, 204 (1868); Mills v. Smith, 75 U.S.(8 Wall.) 27, 32
(1868). But see Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670-71 (1944) (stating that
ultimate facts implicitly requiring application of law by nature are not immune from court
consideration).
Appellate review of the facts and weight of the evidence has been objected to on grounds
that the appellate court is ill-suited to assess witnesses' testimony, its already crowded
docket makes factual review inefficacious, and the jury is no longer left as the final arbiter of
the facts. L. ORFIELD, supra note 87, at 85-87. The fact that the jury may not be left as the
final arbiter is considered to be less troublesome due to the modern trend of more jury
control by the courts. Id. at 87.
As with the case of the trial judge and jury, much of the uneasiness with appellate review
of weight of the evidence is rooted in the uncertainty as to whether the issues being re-
viewed are actually those of fact or of law. Parker, Jury Reversal and the Appellate Court
View of Law and Fact, 14 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 287, 288, 302 (1976). Professor Parker raises
the question that "if the appeal court is examining the fact finding of the trial judge, is it
simply questioning that judge's competence in the purely discretionary area of fact? Alter-
natively, is the very difficult question of deciding what is fact and what is law of its very
nature a question of law?" Id. at 302.
89. Thompson, supra note 50, at 499 n.2. Since In re Winship requires that each ele-
ment of a crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of due process of law,
consideration of the weight in meeting the reasonable doubt standard is given by the appel-
late court.
But reviewing the weight of the evidence creates problems in terms of law and fact. In
exemplifying this difficulty, Professor Graham Parker refers to J. WELLS, A TREATISE ON
QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. INSTRUCTIONS TO JuRms AND BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS (1876),
where Wells stated simply that the jury tries the facts and the judge tries the law. Tongue-
in-cheek, Parker comments that Wells spends the next 750 pages clarifying his seemingly
simple thesis. Parker, supra note 88, at 302. See also J. AUSTIN, 1 LECTURES IN JURIsPRU-
DENCE 236 (1869), where the philosopher's statements, if applied to the determination of
whether a jury verdict is reasonable, present neither questions of fact nor law to the appel-
late court:
What can be more indefinite, for instance, than the expressions of reasonable
time, reasonable notice, reasonable diligence? ...The truth is that they are
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power of federal appellate courts has been advocated by John C.
Godbold, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit:
Modern appellate courts engage in finding facts and accepting evidence. At
times this is done without discussion and with the feeling that the court is
acting solely out of the exigencies of the situation and not on a principled
basis. Actually, appellate fact finding is an established and proper device that
is available for discretionary use by the federal courts of appeal to the benefit
of all directly concerned and of society in general, and without injury to
courts or to the body of law. 0
When used with discretion, the fact-finding power of an appel-
late court will not undermine the integrity of the trial court.,1 Not
surprisingly then, statutory authority may grant the appellate
court the status of "thirteenth juror," 2 and enable the appellate
court to examine the evidence with the same scrutiny as the origi-
nal trier of fact. 3
questions neither of law or of fact. The fact may be perfectly ascertained, and so
may the law, as far as it is capable of being ascertained .... The difficulty is
... in determining not what the law is, or what the fact is, but whether the
given law is applicable to the given fact.
An appellate reversal in the interests of justice, then, raises the question of whether the
weight of the evidence considered, i.e., the reasonableness of the jury's verdict, is really a
question of fact. Or is the issue simply applying the interests of justice (the law) to the
circumstances of the case (the facts)?
90. Godbold, Fact Finding By Appellate Courts-An Available and Appropriate
Power, 12 CuM. L. REV. 365, 389 (1982).
91. Id. at 383. See, e.g., Note, Appeal and Error. Fact Finding Power of Appellate
Courts in California: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 956a, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 171 (1932). This study
of the California appellate courts' fact-finding activities under a then-recently enacted sec-
tion 956a, of the State Code of Civil Procedure revealed that the appellate courts had not
converted themselves to finders of fact but rather, used the power sparingly. See also Note,
Fact Finding Power of Appellate Courts in California, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 500 (1928).
92. In New York, for example, the intermediate appellate court retains such power
through § 470.15 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which provides, in part:
3. A reversal or a modification of a judgment, sentence or order must be based
upon a determination made:
(a) Upon the law; or
(b) Upon the facts; or
(c) As a matter of discretion in the interest of justice;
5. "The kinds of determinations of reversal or modification deemed to be on the
facts include, but are not limited to, a determination that a verdict of conviction
resulting in a judgment was, in whole or in part, against the weight of the
evidence.
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 470.15(3), (5) (McKinney 1971).
93. Godbold, supra note 90, at 374.
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When the appellate court does examine the evidence, and ren-
ders a determination contrary to that of the jury, it does not
merely disagree with the jury, it overrules the jury. The use of such
power by the appellate court is premised not on its ability to re-
view evidence, but rather on its authority as an adjunct of the
state. By looking at the appellate court in this capacity, the
weight-of-the-evidence argument in Tibbs can indeed be
supported.
B. The Appellate Court's Dominion Over the Jury in Tibbs
The province of the "original trier of fact" is certainly not free
from impingement by the trier of law."' Yet, the idea of popular
sovereignty warrants a trial by jury in order to secure protection of
the defendant.9 5 An expression of the premium placed on the role
of the jury can be found in the Supreme Court's holding that a
defendant initially is in jeopardy only after the jury is empanelled
and sworn.98 Choosing this particular time in the trial proceedings
to attach jeopardy "lies in the need to protect the accused in re-
taining a chosen jury. '9 7 Despite this confidence in the jury by the
defendant, it has been stated that juries can make mistakes which
favor the state, and should be open to correction. The fact that
the defendant requests an appeal to question the findings of the
jury should give little cause to argue that the defendant's right to a
jury trial is being impaired by the review of the appellate court.99
The modern means of correcting the jury-by granting a new
trial if the verdict is clearly contrary to the weight of the evi-
dence-is rooted in English common law. o10 Originally, jurors were
94. Tibbs and its ensuing discussion centers on the appellate court's role in its trial-
review capacity, i.e. being bound by the record of the trial court. The penetration of the
trier of law is certainly all-encompassing on a review by trial de novo where "the appellate
court will try the case, and determine the issues and the rights of all parties involved, as
though the suit had been filed originally in the appellate court; and such an appeal removes
the case in its entirety from the lower court to the appellate court." 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error
§ 1528(a) (1958) (citations omitted). See also 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appeal and Error § 703 (1962).
95. L. ORmLD, supra note 87, at 87; See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
96. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978).
97. Id. at 35. See also Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Serfass v. United
States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); 1 F. WHARTON, WHAR-
TON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 56 (14th ed. 1978).
98. L. ORFIELD, supra note 87, at 87.
99. Id.
100. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 346-47 (7th ed. 1956); A. VANDER-
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summoned to the court as witnesses to the event in question, using
only their personal knowledge in rendering a verdict.10 1 Eventually
the jury assumed a more judicial function as it was informed of the
facts in issue by other witnesses. 102 When jurors were still charac-
terized as witnesses they would be found guilty of perjury if they
rendered a verdict contrary to the court's belief. 10 3 In such a case
the remedy imposed by the court was a writ of attaint, whereby
the jury verdict was overturned, the jurors were subjected to severe
penalties, and a second jury of twenty-four members was empanel-
led.'0 4 As the jury assumed the role of trier of fact, the writ of at-
taint was deemed to be a harsh control since the jury was actually
acting upon the .evidence of other witnesses. 0 5 Although after
Bushell's Case'06 a judge could no longer "order the jury on pain of
punishment to take his view of the facts,' 0 7 the courts still re-
tained the power to grant new trials in cases of jury "miscon-
duct."'' 0 In the case of new trials, however, the court was not left
without balancing considerations:
As regards criminal cases, the doctrine of new trials had to pay regard to the
pleasure and interests of the crown, on the one side, and, on the other, to
considerations of mercy for the accused, and especially to the ancient maxim
that saved a man from being put a second time in jeopardy of life or limb."'
BILT, supra note 81, at 54.
101. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 100 at 317; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OP ENGLISH LAW 622 (2d ed. 1898); Tan TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANvmL 34-36 (Hall ed. 1965). The author
states, "Each juror summoned for this purpose must swear that he will not declare falsely,
nor knowingly suppress the truth. The knowledge required from the jurors is that they shall
know about the matter from what they have personally seen and heard ...."
102. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 100, at 334; J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 132-33 (1898).
103. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 100, at 337.
104. A. VANDERBILT, supra note 81, at 53. The court would punish the jurors for such
forms of misconduct as the rendering of a not guilty verdict, by fines or imprisonment. The
Star Chamber considered any verdict of acquittal against the weight of the evidence as a
corrupt verdict. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 100, at 337-39, 343.
105. J. THAYER, supra note 102, at 162.
106. Vaug. Rep. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
107. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 100, at 345. In Bushell's Case, Chief Justice
Vaughan ruled that a jury could not be fined and imprisoned for acquitting two Quakers
because the members of the jury are the judges of facts and may have private knowledge of
the facts, parties, or witnesss above and beyond that of the judge. Id. at 344-47; see also A.
VANDERBILT, supra note 81, at 53-54.
108. J. THAYER, supra note 102, at 169.
109. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
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C. Discretionary Considerations Made by the Appellate Court
in Tibbs
The weight/sufficiency dichotomy employed by the Court in
Tibbs describes more than a subtle distinction in the inadequacy of
trial evidence. The foregoing analysis of the "thirteenth juror"
under the "weight" rubric suggests that the fact-finding province
of the jury is not free from the supervisory controls of the trial
judge and appellate court. The rules of evidence and motions made
by the parties give the trial judge opportunities to expand or con-
tract the fact-finding province. Similarly, an appellate court exerts
control over the jury through its right to grant a new jury trial if it
deems the original jury has rendered an erroneous guilty verdict.11 0
The granting of a new trial may be viewed as a vestige of the form
of jury reprimand practiced before Bushell's Case.""' In granting a
new trial the court looks at both the interests of the state and the
exigencies of the defendant's situation.
In Tibbs, the Court seemed to implicitly consider "the pleas-
ure and interests of the crown" in determining that "society should
not exact the price of immunity for every defendant who persuades
an appellate panel to overturn an error-free conviction ....
The Court also bestowed "considerations of mercy" upon the ac-
cused by recognizing that although the defendant's conviction was
error-free, the appellate court's own disagreement with the jury
verdict should be ample reason to at least grant "the defendant a
second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment.M1 3
Therefore, in addition to being the reviewer of evidence, an
appellate court may also be assuming a more dominant and active
role. As the "thirteenth juror," the appellate court is more than an
110. In New York, for example, exerting such control of the jury by the intermediate
appellate court is not allowed. Perhaps as a response to the inability to differentiate weight
and sufficiency when, under both, the evidence did not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
§ 470.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides, in relevant part, that a new trial will not
be allowed:
5. Upon a reversal or modification of a judgment after trial upon the ground
that the verdict, either in its entirety or with respect to a particular count or
counts, is against the weight of the trial evidence, the court must dismiss the
accusatory instrument or any reversed count.
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 470.20(5) (McKinney 1971) (emphasis added).
111. See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
112. 457 U.S. at 44.
113. Id. at 43.
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"equal partner" in the creation of a "hung" jury. In reversing the
jury verdict, the appellate court may be taking into consideration
factors other than mere disagreement with the jury about the ade-
quacy of the evidence. The granting of a new trial by an appellate
court may be directed at correcting and controlling the petit jury
by giving a second jury the opportunity to render a verdict conso-
nant with the appellate court's view of the evidence. With this de-
cision to retry, the court will consider the state's interest and the
defendant's particular situation. Given these considerations, the
Court in Tibbs may have deemed a retrial to be not so much a
second jeopardy, but rather a second opportunity for a jury to find
the defendant innocent.
CONCLUSION
If Tibbs is viewed solely in the light of the first role of the
appellate court, the decision to retry the defendant is troublesome;
evidence which is inadequate to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt implies finality and termination of the defendant's jeopardy.
Practically speaking, the state has failed to convict and the double
jeopardy clause should preclude any further prosecution. Having
the applicability of double jeopardy protection hinge upon the la-
bel given to the inadequate evidence appears to be unduly entrap-
ping. Here, the weight/sufficiency dichotomy is perhaps a distinc-
tion without a difference, employed mainly to avoid the impact of
the rule in Burks.
If, however, Tibbs is viewed according to the second possible
role of the appellate court, the decision to retry in cases where the
conviction is questionable is not surprising and may even be pre-
ferred. Viewed from this perspective, the weight argument allows
an appellate court to exercise discretionary considerations that
have sprouted out of the appellate court's longstanding dominion
over juries and jury verdicts. The appellate court could not have
this liberty if evidentiary sufficiency was its only avenue of pursuit.
Under the yoke of the sufficiency argument, the appellate court is
limited to options at the extremes: to affirm the conviction and
keep a possibly innocent defendant incarcerated, or to dismiss the
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conviction and release a possibly guilty defendant. Tibbs has given
courts an additional option, one which lies between these two
extremes.
THOMAS S. GINTER
